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IRAN, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND U.S. TRADE
SANCTIONS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Nadia L. Luhr*
INTRODUCTION
A significant unfolding of events took place recently: an
oppressive regime brazenly rigged an election;' the country
underwent an extraordinary civil rights movement; and somehow,
despite the government's best efforts to control information leaving
the country, we in the United States received first-hand accounts of
the turmoil, complete with photographs, video, and commentary.
Critics hailed the use of social media to broadcast the historic
events in Iran, and the phrase "Twitter Revolution" 2 became clich6
within days.
And yet, this powerful tool that we have witnessed in its
new capacity, this seemingly censorship-proof, dictator-proof
communication tool, faced serious challenges from an unexpected
source: the government of the United States. American Web 2.0'
companies were correctly interpreting U.S. trade sanctions against
countries like Iran, Sudan, and Cuba to mean that they must not
allow users in those countries to access the companies' websites,
and an alarming number of blockages took place.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011.
1. For a discussion and critique of the recent Iranian elections, see infra
text accompanying notes 13-21.
2. See, e.g., PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., 140 CHARACTERS OF PROTEST (2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/
1267/iran-twitter-revolution (referring to the "Twitter Revolution").
3. Web 2.0 sites are those that enable an end-user to interact with and
contribute to the website. See Core Characteristics of Web 2.0 Services,
http://www.techpluto.com/web-20-services (Nov. 28, 2008). Examples include
blog hosting websites, photo and video sharing websites, and social
networking websites. Id.
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By including these communication tools in the sanctions,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers
America's sanctions regime, ignored a well-established
constitutional principle: the First Amendment guarantees a right to
unhindered communication, and the receipt of communications
from abroad is no exception. Prohibiting American Web 2.0
companies from providing access to users in sanctioned countries
restricted Americans' ability to receive communications from these
users, and such a prohibition constituted unconstitutional prior
restraint.
While OFAC chose not to pursue any legal action to
enforce this aspect of its sanctions, it only recently came to
recognize formally the informational value of these Internet-based
services. In the summer of 2009, the State Department encouraged
Twitter's role in the aftermath of the Iranian elections,4 and in
December 2009, the State Department requested a general license
that would allow the export of Web 2.0 tools to users in Iran.5
Three months later, OFAC complied with this request and even
extended the amendment to its sanctions against Cuba and Sudan,
creating general licenses that allow for the exportation of Web 2.0
tools to "ensure that individuals in these countries can exercise
their universal right to free speech and information to the greatest
extent possible."6 Though, as this Note argues, these revisions were
constitutionally mandated, officials attributed them solely to a well-
placed concern for the welfare of citizens in sanctioned countries.
Such a move is promising, but the fragility of a general license is
problematic and fails to offer a permanent solution to the sanctions.
4. See Sue Pleming, U.S. State Department Speaks to Twitter over Iran,
REUTERS, June 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssTechMedia
TelecomNews /idUSWBT0 1137420090616.
5. See Letter and Report from Richard R. Verma, United States
Department of State, to Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate (Dec. 15, 2009), [hereinafter Verma Letter]
available at http://Ievin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2009/SASC. Iran
Report. 121509.pdf.
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Dep't Issues New
Gen. License to Boost Internet-Based Commc'n, Free Flow of Info. in Iran,
Sudan and Cuba (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tg577.htm.
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This Note will analyze the status of the law prior to the
recent amendments to the sanctions. Using Iran as a case study,
this Note sheds light on a problem that has not been wholly
eliminated by the issuance of a general license. After discussing the
events surrounding the Iranian elections, the subsequent role of
social media, and the trade sanctions at issue, this Note will
highlight the First Amendment violations posed by the previous
sanctions and analyze the constitutionality of the prior restraint
they imposed. This Note illustrates the need to provide those in
repressive regimes with some semblance of informational freedom,
while clarifying that the revision of the sanctions was not only
desirable, but constitutionally compelled.
I. CASE STUDY: THE IRANIAN ELECTIONS AND THEIR
AFTERMATH
A. The Elections
On June 12, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran held its tenth
presidential election.7 The atmosphere in Iran prior to the election
was heavy with excitement and energy. A reform movement was
taking place and it appeared that conservative incumbent President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be defeated.8 Of his three rivals,
reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi had the most support and was
widely expected to win the election.9 Reformist Mehdi Karroubi
also had a strong following,"' with conservative Mohsen Rezai
7. Alan Taylor, Iran's Presidential Election: The Big Picture, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 12, 2009, http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/20O9/06/irans-
presidentialelection.html.
8. See Posting of Laura Secor to News Desk, http://www.newyorker.com/
online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/06/laura-secor-irans-stolen-election.htm (June 13,
2009).
9. See id. Government polls taken before the election allegedly showed
Mousavi leading by ten to twenty points one week before the election. Id.
10. Id.
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fading into the background." The turnout on election day was
incredibly high, with Ministry of the Interior estimates of eighty-
five percent of the eligible population voting. 2
One hour after the polls closed, results began pouring in,
and less than twenty-four hours later, Ahmadinejad was declared
the winner of a landslide election with a reported 62.6% of the
vote. 3 The credibility of the results was immediately scrutinized,
both in Iran and abroad, as the reformist candidates and their
supporters cried foul.' 4  Skeptics of Ahmadinejad's purported
victory point to several anomalies in doubting its legitimacy: a large
discrepancy between pre-election polls and the election results; 5 a
startling homogeneity of support for Ahmadinejad across the entire
country, when past experience, polls, and common sense dictate
that candidates should vary in popularity in different regions; 6 and
trends in Iranian elections establishing that a "high turnout favors
11. See Times Topics: Mohsen Rezai, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/r/mohsen-rezai/i
ndex.html.
12. Ahmadinejad Hails Elections as Protests Grow, CNN, June 13, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/13/iran.election/index.html.
13. Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Protests Flare in Tehran as
Opposition Disputes Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/l4lworld/middleeastll 4iran.html.
14. See, e.g., Landslide or Fraud? The Debate Online Over Iran's
Election Results, The Lede, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/
landslide-or-fraud-the-debate-online-over-irans-election-results (June 13,
2009, 11:16 EST) (describing reactions to the election results both in Iran and
internationally).
15. See Secor, supra note 8.
16. See Simon Robinson, Five Reasons to Suspect Iran's Election Results:
Are Any of the Vote Totals Suspicious?, TIME, June 15, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1904645_1904644_
1904639,00.html. This was particularly blatant in Mousavi's hometown,
Tabriz, where Ahmadinejad garnered fifty-seven percent of the vote despite
Mousavi's overwhelming popularity in the area and a historical trend of voters
in that region supporting home-grown candidates. Julian Borger, The Iranian
Election Controversy: What Happens Now, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 14,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/14/iran-elections-ahmadine
jad-mousavi-questions.
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reformers."' 7 In support of these claims, several statistical studies
suggest that the numbers reported by the Ministry of the Interior
were manipulated.'
A look at the political structure in Iran does little to dispel
the accusations. Elections in Iran are administered by the Ministry
of the Interior and ultimately overseen by the Guardian Council.'9
In other words, Ahmadinejad had considerable influence over the
vote count,' which was supervised only by a conservative
governmental body.2' There was no independent oversight,22
making the conditions ripe for state-sponsored fraud. The claims of
fraud are compelling and render it difficult to believe in the veracity
of Ahmadinejad's landslide victory. Regardless, whether a
fraudulent election took place is not determinative to the analysis at
hand. The subsequent events, however, are at the heart of the
issue.
17. See Secor, supra note 8. With a reported turnout of 85% of eligible
voters, the results should have been in the reformists' favor.
18. See, e.g., Julie Rehmeyer, Statistical Tests Suggestive of Fraud in
Iran's Election, SCIENCE NEWS, July 10, 2009, http://www.sciencenews.org/
view/generic/id145480/title/Statistical tests-suggestive-of-fraud inIran%E2
%80%99selection (describing a study performed by statistician Walter
Mebane). One such study posits that the probability that numbers were not
manipulated is less than .005. Bernd Beber & Alexandra Scacco, The Devil is
in the Digits, WASH. POST, June 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/con ten t/article/2009/06/20/A R2009062000004.h tml.
19. Q&A: Iran's Presidential Election, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8081440.stm.
20. The Ministry of the Interior is headed by Sadeq Mahsouli, "a general
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and a senior aide to Mr. Ahmadinejad."
Amir Taheri, Iran's Clarifying Election, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2009, at A15.
21. The Guardian Council is "the most influential body in Iran and is
currently controlled by conservatives. It consists of six theologians appointed
by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and
approved by parliament." Guide: How Iran is Ruled, BBC NEWS, June 9,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8051750.stm.
22. See Taheri, supra note 20.
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B. A Civil Rights Movement
In the aftermath of the election, Iran underwent an
extraordinary civil rights movement 23 in what is being called the
country's "worst unrest . . . since the 1979 revolution."2 4  The
opposition movement ignored demonstration bans and government
25threats, and the weeks that followed were a mix of protests,
violence, and arrests as reformists took to the streets en masse.
Protesters were met daily with escalating violence and
arrests 26 as they clashed with police and the Basij, 27 a state-
sponsored paramilitary militia. These conflicts sparked global
shock and outcry, with eyewitness accounts, photographs, and
videos documenting the violence. 28 As the days passed and tens of
thousands of protesters continued to defy the government, the
23. Although the events surrounding the election have been called a
revolution, they have been viewed more critically as a civil rights movement.
The events are reminiscent of the Revolution in 1979, but the protesters are
fighting for their rights rather than for a regime change. See Posting of John
Roberts to amFIX, http://amfix.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/22/expert-protestors-
want-civil-rights-not-revolution (June 22, 2009, 10:02 EST).
24. Iran Recount Gives Ahmadinejad Win, AL JAZEERA, June 29, 2009,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/O6/2009629151258105455.ht
ml.
25. Post-Election Clampdown in Iran, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8100310.stm. See also Martin Fletcher, Leading
Demonstrators Must be Executed, Ayatollah Khatami Demands, TIMES
(London), June 27, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/world/middleeast/article6583797.ece.
26. See Ban Urges End to Arrests, Use of Force Amid Post-Election
Violence in Iran, UN NEWS CENTRE, June 22, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=31232&Cr=iran&Crl.
27. The Basij was created by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and served as a
"civilian auxiliary force subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards." Posting of
Jon Lee Anderson to News Desk, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
newsdesk/2009/06/jon-lee-anderson-understanding-the-basij.html (June 19,
2009). Ahmadinejad himself was a member of the Basij. Id.
28. See Iran: Halt the Crackdown, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 19,
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown. Influential
cleric Ayatollah Khatami denounced the protesters in a sermon, accusing
them of waging a war against God and calling for leading rioters to be
punished "firmly and without showing any mercy to teach everyone a lesson."
Fletcher, supra note 25.
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police continued meeting protest with aggression and attacks by the
Basiji became more violent and resolute.2 9
The protests continued well into late July, morphing from
overt street rallies into more stealthy affairs. Eventually,
however, Ahmadinejad was inaugurated for his second term as
president. 3' The Iranian government estimated the deaths of
twenty-five to thirty people during the protests while others
reported the death toll to be approximately seventy-two. 3' And in
October 2009, Iran issued the first three death sentences in its
"post-election mass opposition trial," with more such sentences
expected to follow.
33
It was through non-traditional social media that Iranians
were able to communicate these events to the rest of the world, and
through which we were able to piece together an understanding of
this historic civil rights movement. In repressive regimes such as
Iran's, where the government will not hesitate to block the
29. One journalist blogger described the violence of the Basiji:
In the mass demonstrations that have taken place this
week, the modus operandi of the Basijis has been brutal
and predatory. . . . [T]hey have continued to attack
surreptitiously and in terrifying ways, jumping
demonstrators as they return home on darkened streets at
night. On Wednesday, there were reports that men who
appeared to be Basijis had come onto the Tehran
University campus and had stabbed students with knives.
Anderson, supra note 27.
30. See Robin Wright, Iran's Protesters: Phase 2 of Their Feisty
Campaign, TIME, July 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1912941,00.html (describing how individuals boycotted goods and
turned on all their appliances when the state sponsored news aired in an
attempt to overload the power grid); Arrests at New Iranian Protests, BBC
NEWS, July 21, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/8161824.stm.
31. Robert F. Worth & Nazila Fathi, Iran Leader Takes Oath Of Office,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A6.
32. Samira Simone, Iran Reformist Web Site Names Post-Election
Victims, CNN, Sept. 4, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/04/
iran.election.protests/index.html.
33. See Ali Akbar Dareini, Iran Sentences Three to Death in Post-
Election Mass Opposition Trial, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 10, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/10/iran-sentences-3-to-death 0_n_
316454.html.
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communications of its citizens, these channels of communication
are vital.
C. Censorship
Information normally leaves Iran freely, and prior to the
post-election turmoil, foreign journalists were given visas to cover
the elections from inside the country.34 In the aftermath of the
elections, however, the Iranian government clamped down on the
flow of information. It attempted not only to hinder
communications within the country, but also to eliminate non-state-
sponsored reporting of the election aftermath to the outside
world.3
5
Foreign journalists' reporting rights were revoked at the
commencement of the unauthorized protests and subsequent
36
violence. Confined to their hotels and offices and prohibited from
reporting on the streets,37 foreign journalists were left only with
permission to monitor official state media -independent visual
documentation of the demonstrations was strictly prohibited.38 One
correspondent reported to the BBC that the restrictions were "the
most sweeping ... he has ever encountered reporting anywhere. 39
In a matter of days, most foreign journalists were ordered to leave
34. David Blair, Iran Struggles to Censor News of Protests, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), June 15, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
iran/5543145/Iran-struggles-to-censor-news-of-protests.html.
35. See id. Rafsanjani, chair of Iran's Assembly of Experts, accused the
foreign media of using "psychological warfare" to create turmoil in Iran, and
stressed the necessity of blocking their "plots." Foreign Media Sowing
Discord in Iran, Says Cleric, RADIO FREE EUROPE, Sept. 22, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/ForeignMediaSowing-Discord In-IranSays-
Cleric/1828269.html.
36. See Iran Clamps Down on Foreign Media, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8103269.stm.
37. See Iran Bans International Journalists from Covering Rallies, CNN,
June 16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2O09/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.journalists.
banned/index.html.
38. Christopher Rhoads, Geoffrey A. Fowler & Chip Cummins, Iran
Cracks Down on Internet Use, Foreign Media, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2009, at
A9.
39. Iran Clamps Down, supra note 36.
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the country and numerous domestic and foreign journalists were
detained.
The Iranian government paid special attention to Internet
use in its information crackdown. Its information-control tactics,
however, deviated from those employed recently by regimes such as
Myanmar and China. Myanmar, for example, completely severed
Internet access during its 2007 uprising, while China allows high-
speed access while retaining "extensive censorship of Web sites
deemed harmful by the government.,, 41
Choosing not to follow either of these models, the Iranian
government instead slowed the Internet to a speed that was "almost
42
unusable," and blocked access to specific websites, including news
websites belonging to The Guardian and the BBC, and social media
41
websites such as Facebook and Twitter. 4 Iranians, however, are
sophisticated internet users,44 and were able to access the
communication tools they needed.45
D. Role of Web 2.0 Communication
Anyone attempting to follow the unfolding events could
attest to the frustration that accompanied his or her search for
information-it seemed that the mainstream media simply had
little to offer. People turned instead to blogs and Web 2.0 services
to follow the barrage of events. Iranians were able to circumvent
some of the Internet-blocking tactics of their government and post
40. Martin Fletcher, Foreign Journalists Arrested as Iran Restricts Reports
on Opposition, TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/middle_east/article6906209.ece.
41. Rhoads, supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. Posting of Christian Christensen to Le Monde Diplomatique,
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/iran-networked-dissent (July 2009).
44. Twenty-eight percent of the population uses the Internet, "with an
estimated 60,000 to 100,000 active blogs." Rhoads, supra note 38.
45. Users in Iran used proxy servers, gaining access to these websites
through intermediaries rather than having to request access from the site
itself, which would be blocked. See Christensen, supra note 43.
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a seemingly endless stream of photos, videos, and commentary on
websites such as Twitter,4 6 Facebook, and YouTube. 7
Twitter was inundated with posts used both as
communication between protesters and communication with the
outside world:48 "Tens of thousands of protesters are chanting 'No
fear, no fear' . . . . There is panic in streets. People going ino [sic]
houses to hide . . . . Bassej [sic] shooting in Azadi sq-army
standing by and watching for now., 49 Twitter users also posted
links to Flickr accounts with photographs of the protests. Of the
multitude of amateur videos uploaded to YouTube, several became
viral 511 immediately-most notably a cell phone video of a young
woman named Neda dying on the street after being shot in the
chest.: Other videos showed protests, Basij attacks, and violent
clashes between opposition members and the police.
Several key media outlets, including CNN, the New York
Times, and the Huffington Post chose to report the information
coming in from these sources," in stark contrast to the remaining
46. Twitter is a "real time information network" that allows users to post
messages of 140 characters or fewer. See Twitter: About, http://twitter.com/
about (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
47. Brian Stelter, Journalism Rules are Bent in News Coverage from Iran,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at BI.
48. Mary Kate Cary, The Iran Election Twitters In a Revolution-In the
Media, July 1, 2009, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 1, 2009,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/07/01 /the-iran-election-twit ters-
in-a-revolution--in-the-media.html.
49. Andrew Sullivan, Twitter Ripped the Veil off 'The Other'-and We
Saw Ourselves, TIMES (London), June 21, 2009,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech-andweb/theweb/article65
44276.ece (internal quotations omitted).
50. A viral video is one that becomes popular through media sharing
websites.
51. See Robert Tait & Matthew Weaver, The Accidental Martyr. How
Neda Soltani Became the Face of Iran's Struggle, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 23,
2009, at 1.
52. Stelter, supra note 47. For example, the New York Times solicited
eyewitness accounts in the following manner: "The New York Times would
like readers in Iran to help us document the post-election unrest in Iran.
Please upload your photographs using the form below, letting us know when
and where the photographs were taken and whether you wish to remain
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
news companies, which offered either minimal coverage or relied
on what they could glean from Iran's state-sponsored media.53
Those media outlets using eyewitness accounts were careful to warn
that their reports came from unverified sources. CNN, while
soliciting eyewitness accounts for its iReport feature, 54 told its
viewers that CNN reporters had been pulled out of Iran and that
these eyewitness photos and videos were being deployed to tell the
story.55
The Huffington Post acclimated quickly to this new form of
journalism, accepting eyewitness journalism the day after the
election and continuously updating its coverage.56 And its readers
responded. In the two weeks directly following the election, its Iran
• 51
coverage received more than five million page views. In choosing
between state-sponsored information and eyewitness accounts, the
rules of journalism were relaxed. "'Check the source' may be the
first rule of journalism. But in the coverage of the protests in Iran
this month, some news organizations have adopted a different
stance: publish first, ask questions later. If you still don't know the
answer, ask your readers., 58  The media outlets that chose
eyewitness accounts understood one thing: whether the outside
world received the information first-hand on Twitter or YouTube,
or from news networks relating those same reports, these Web 2.0
services were the sole means of staying meaningfully informed.
anonymous." Iran's Presidential Elections, http://submit.nytimes.com/iranian-
readers-share-your-election-experience (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
53. Cary, supra note 48.
54. "iReport is the way people like you report the news. The stories in
this section are not edited, fact-checked or screened before they post. Only
ones marked 'CNN iReport' have been vetted by CNN." About CNN
iReport, http://www.ireport.com/about.jspa (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
55. Stelter, supra note 47.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
510 [Vol. 8
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E. What is at Stake
Prior to the March 2010 revisions, 9 U.S. trade sanctions
forbade American Web 2.0 companies from allowing users in Iran
to access their websites. Attorneys were advising their clients to
block users in countries such as Iran, Cuba, and Sudan, and many
companies complied, including Google, AOL, Yahoo, Microsoft,
LinkedIn, and BlueHost.N
Had Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube acted similarly, the
coverage of the events in Iran would have been very different.
Because of these tools, news consumers were able to learn of the
events taking place from sources other than heavily censored or
state-sponsored media and were able to engage in open
communication with those undertaking a massive civil rights
movement against a repressive regime.
The revision of the trade sanctions through the issuance of a
general license allows for these Web 2.0 tools to continue to
• 61
provide access in sanctioned countries. Otherwise, not only would
our First Amendment right to receive communications be
significantly hindered, but there would be a serious risk that the
next uprising in a repressive regime would be held behind closed
doors. The U.S. State Department seemed to realize this in its
December 2009 report,62 and OFAC conceded as much through its
issuance of a general license in March 2010; yet such a revision
lacks the permanence needed to assure that these tools will not be
at risk in the future.
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60. See Jessica Dheere, Google Blocks Chrome Browser Use in Syria,
lran, MEDIASHIFT, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/10/
google-blocks-chrome-browser-use-in-syria-iran287.html; Eric Lai, Should
Facebook, Twitter Follow IM Providers and Block Access to U.S. 'Enemies'?,
COMPUTERWORLD, June 10, 2009, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9134233/ShouldFacebookTwitterfollowIMprovidersandblockaccesst
o_U.S._enemies_ (quoting Clif Burns, an attorney with Bryan Cave LLP).
61. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 6.
62. See Verma Letter, supra note 5.
It. THE TRADE SANCTIONS
A. Generally
OFAC is the administrative agency responsible for, among
other things, enforcing trade sanctions against countries, regions,
and individuals who threaten the national security, foreign policy,
or economic welfare of the United States. 61 Current OFAC
regulations include trade sanctions against countries such as Iran,
Myanmar, Cuba, and Sudan. 64  Although there are separate
regulations for each sanctioned country, each deals with the export
of goods and services in the same manner, generally prohibiting
trade while recognizing several exceptions.65
For example, OFAC regulatory sanctions against Iran
provide in relevant part that "the exportation, reexportation, sale,
or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a
United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology,
or services to Iran or the Government of Iran is prohibited. 66 The
corresponding provisions for the other sanctioned countries are
written in nearly identical language.67
The most prevalent exception in the sanctions, and one that
attempts to protect free speech, is the exception for informational
materials. According to the sanctions, the export of information
and informational materials to these countries is exempted from the
prohibitions.68 Information and informational materials include
63. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Our Mission, http://www.treas.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/mission.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
64. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#9
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
65. See, e.g., Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 538 (2009);
Iranian Transaction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560 (2009) (enumerating OFAC-
imposed rules governing the export of goods and services).
66. 31 C.F.R. § 560.204.
67. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 538.205 ("[T]he exportation or reexportation,
directly or indirectly, to Sudan of any goods, technology . . . or services ... is
prohibited.").
68. 31 C.F.R. § 560.210(c).
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"[p]ublications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs,
microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks,
and news wire feeds. '' 69 OFAC's interpretive guidance, however,
explicitly maintained prohibition of "the provision of services to...
assist in the creation of information and informational materials."7 (
OFAC clarified the difference between the provision of basic
information and the provision of a service in a 2003 guidance
document, comparing the mere uniform listing of information on a
website to the "provision of... services... above and beyond the
mere dissemination of information."" This language seems to
disqualify Web 2.0 services from the exemption for informational
materials, subjecting them to the regulatory sanctions.
The sanctions are based on a licensing scheme whereby
American entities and individuals can obtain either general or
specific licenses to engage in otherwise prohibited trade with a
sanctioned country.72 General licenses exist for preauthorized
categories of transactions, yet until March 2010, OFAC's general
licenses for trade with Iran and other sanctioned countries were
inapplicable to Web 2.0 services.7" Specific licenses, on the other
69. 31 C.F.R. § 560.315.
70. OFAC Interpretive Guidance, 030915-FACRL-IA-09, 1 (2003),
available at http://www.treas.govloffices/enforcement/ofac/rulings/ia092303.pdf
(providing an opinion on when and how the informational exemption would
apply to a hypothetical website company publishing materials in Farsi and
seeking to distribute them in Iran).
71. OFAC Interpretive Guidance, Posting of Information from Iran on
Website (Iran), 031211-FACRL-IA-14, 2 (2003), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/int-guide/ial216
03.pdf.
72. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, http://www.treas.govloffices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtm#60
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
73. See Cuban Assets Control: Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian
Transactions Regulations, 175 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified
at 31 C.F.R. pts. 515, 538, and 560) (issuing general licenses for Web 2.0
service use in Cuba, Sudan, and Iran). Currently, OFAC also recognizes
general licenses for Iran based on funds transfers aimed at humanitarian relief,
and for the transactions of six listed international organizations related to
business involving Iran. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.539.
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hand, are issued on a case-by-case basis by OFAC,7 4 and past
denials indicate that Web 2.0 services would not have qualified for
specific licensing. Interpretive guidance provided by OFAC in 2003
is representative of its past approach to web-based services: an
American company wished to offer, for a fee, "enhanced Internet-
based listings" in which Iranian companies could post information
about themselves on the website. 5 OFAC was troubled by both
"the substantive enhancement of information" by Iranian users and
the provision of online customer support.16  OFAC thereby
declared that the provision of such services was prohibited by the
sanctions, and that the issuance of a license in that case "would be
inconsistent with current licensing policy."77
Web 2.0 companies were likely correct in interpreting these
sanctions as prohibiting the use of their websites by persons in Iran.
Given that the interactivity and user-based nature of these websites
goes far beyond the mere listing of basic information and crosses
into the realm of a service, the export of these communication tools
violated trade sanctions. "If you ask any lawyer who regularly
practices in this area, they would say don't offer the service [to
sanctioned countries]. ' '7X
B. Penalties and Blocks
Absent an exemption or a license, any person or entity of
the United States who participates in prohibited trade activity with
a sanctioned country is subject to significant penalties ranging
anywhere from $50,000 to $10,000,000, in addition to possible
74. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Statement of Licensing Policy 1,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/
license pol.pdf.
75. OFAC Interpretive Guidance, Substantive Enhancement of
Information (Iran), 030708-FACRL-IA-08, 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/int-guide/ia07
0803.pdf.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Lai, supra note 60.
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imprisonment.79 Not only are the penalties substantial, but OFAC
applies little leniency when it pursues sanctions violations,
reasoning that the "ramifications of non-compliance, inadvertent or
otherwise, can jeopardize critical foreign policy and national
security goals."" With the threat of such hefty penalties, it is
understandable that U.S. companies took preemptive measures to
ensure their compliance with trade sanctions.
Some of the most prominent Web 2.0 providers were among
the first to block users in sanctioned countries. Google blocked
users in Syria and Iran from downloading its Chrome browser as
well as other downloadable services."' Microsoft blocked its
Windows Live service from download in Cuba, North Korea, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria. 2 Yahoo recently removed "Iran" as an option
from its user registration drop-down menu, in what seemed to be a
less effective attempt at blocking access."' Other blocked services
included AOL Instant Messenger, LinkedIn, and BlueHost, a web
hosting firm.
4
Most strikingly, in 2007 Google Earth collaborated with the
United States Holocaust Museum to create a project called "Crisis
in Darfur," with the proclaimed goal of enabling "more than 200
million Google Earth mapping service users worldwide to visualize
and better understand the genocide currently unfolding in Darfur[,
Sudan].""5 Google then blocked Sudanese users. 6 In doing so,
79. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers. http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#ll
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010). "[Clriminal penalties can include fines ranging
from $50,000 to $10,000,000 and imprisonment ranging from 10 to 30 years for
willful violations.... [C]ivil penalties range from $250,000 or twice the amount
of each underlying transaction to $1,075,000 for each violation." Id.
80. Id.
81. Dheere, supra note 60.
82. Lai, supra note 60.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Press Release, Google, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and
Google Join in Online Darfur Mapping Initiative (n.d.),
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/darfur-mapping.html.
86. Posting of Clif Burns to Export Law Blog,
http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/149 (Apr. 23, 2007, 22:31 EST).
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Google was simply abiding by U.S. sanctions, and yet the result was
an illogical denial of information to Sudanese citizens.
It would seem from the State Department's actions during
the Iranian protests, namely its request that Twitter postpone
website maintenance so as not to interrupt daytime service in Iran,"8
that the U.S. government, even then, saw the value in these tools
and their use by people in repressive regimes. The providers of
websites such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook never followed
suit in blocking users. But given the possible ramifications of
violating sanction laws, and prior to alteration, these sanctions
posed a continuous threat to communication.
In December of 2009, the State Department realized that it
was essential to allow the exportation of these communication tools
to users in sanctioned countries. If citizens of these countries were
able to circumvent their own governments to access them, it was
absurd that U.S. foreign policy presented yet another obstacle to
their ability to communicate. The remainder of this Note will
discuss the First Amendment right to receive communications from
individuals in sanctioned countries and will recognize this right as a
mandate for a more meaningful and permanent revision of the
trade sanctions.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The First Amendment Right to Receive Information
The text of the First Amendment grants a succinct list of
freedoms: those of religion, speech, the press, assembly, and
petition." It has long been recognized, however, that the First
Amendment encompasses more than its plain language -it protects
those rights necessary for the achievement of the amendment's
underlying goals, one of which, as noted by the Supreme Court, is
the assurance of the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the
87. Id.
88. Pleming, supra note 4.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."' "
In Whitney v. California,9' Justice Brandeis spoke of "public
discussion [as] a political duty," and declared it a "fundamental
principle of the American government." 92  Brandeis's views in
Whitney echoed a "marketplace of ideas theory,"93 and the Court in
1943 elaborated on the concept: "The authors of the First
Amendment... chose to encourage a freedom which they believed
essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over
slothful ignorance. 9 4  Later, in 1964, the Supreme Court again
emphasized public dialogue as the core of the First Amendment,
recognizing the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate.95
Thus, in order to achieve political and social change through
the people, the First Amendment grants Americans a right to the
exchange of ideas, public discussion, and public debate-essentially
the right to communicate. Inherent in and necessary for the process
of communication is the receipt of information. Communication
does not begin and end with the giving of information-it must also
be received in order for a dialogue to occur. If we cannot receive
information, we cannot communicate, discuss, or debate, and the
objective of the First Amendment is lost. As articulated by Justice
Brennan, "I think the right to receive publications is . . . a
fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
90. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasis added).
91. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
92. Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
93. Id. (explaining that America's founders understood "that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies . . . [and the] power of reason as applied through public
discussion"). The marketplace of ideas theory is based on the free market
theory and suggests that free public discourse will lead to the truth. The
concept was explained as early as 1919 by Justice Holmes, who wrote that "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
95. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers.
''
9
The significance of the First Amendment right to receive
information justifies the Supreme Court's repeated discussion and
protection of this right over the years.97 For example, in Martin v.
StruthersY the Court upheld the constitutional right to distribute
literature, and at the same time recognized the right to receive it.99
According to the Court, the freedom of speech and press
"embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects
the right to receive it."''I
This right to receive information does not disappear when
the information being received comes from abroad, nor does it
become less vital. The communication that crossed borders during
the recent elections in Iran helped to create an understanding and a
discussion of the historical events taking place. This is precisely
what the First Amendment intended and what the Supreme Court
intends to protect: ideas of social importance and the advancement
of truth. In Lamont v. Postmaster General,"'" the Court recognized
that cross-border communication is no less valuable to the
marketplace of ideas than communications taking place strictly
within the United States.'"2 In Lamont, a federal statute required
the addressee of "communist political propaganda" from abroad to
96. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
97. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is
the [First Amendment] right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount."); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("Freedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists ... the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.").
98. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
99. Id. at 143.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
102. See id. The Court's willingness to protect Americans' right to
receive communications that originate in foreign countries suggests that, in the
context of the First Amendment, such communications are no less valuable to
the marketplace of ideas than communications that originate within the
United States. See id. at 306-07.
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request its delivery in writing from the Postmaster General."3 The
Court found that the statute constituted an "unconstitutional
abridgment" of the First Amendment and upheld the right to
receive information from foreign publishers. ""
The right to receive information, however, like other First
Amendment protections, is not absolute. The constitutionality of
restrictions on this freedom is considered in light of governmental
interests and the manner in which the freedom is being restricted.
Part III.B analyzes the constitutionality of the relevant portions of
the past U.S. trade sanctions.
B. The Past Trade Sanctions Constituted Prior Restraint
By making illegal the export of tools that allowed us to
receive communications from others, the trade sanctions at issue
constituted prior restraint. The prior restraint doctrine is
concerned with governmental actions (typically administrative
actions and judicial orders) that prevent speech from occurring.,05
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,"6 the Supreme Court deemed
prior restraint to be "the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights.""" Examples of prior
restraint include a court order enjoining a newspaper from
publishing "any publication ...containing malicious, scandalous
and defamatory matter; '"" an injunction prohibiting the
publication of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy; ' "'9 and a city ordinance
requiring individuals to obtain permission before distributing
literature. '"'
103. See id. at 302.
104. Id. at 306-07.
105. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 950 (3d ed. 2006).
106. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
107. Id. at 559.
108. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 705 (1931).
109. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S.
713 (1971).
110. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
519
The U.S. trade sanctions prior to March 2010, as applied to
the export of Web 2.0 services to users in sanctioned countries,
suppressed speech in a manner that amounted to prior restraint.
These sanctions mandated that the United States government block
channels of communication, thereby preventing our receipt of
information before any speech could take place. The prior restraint
doctrine is commonly used to protect the First Amendment rights
of speakers rather than receivers of information, given that prior
restraint occurs before communication takes place."' However,
this is a superficial distinction and the Supreme Court has
confirmed that receivers of information are entitled to protection
from prior restraint. 12 Therefore, the remainder of this Note will
utilize prior restraint analysis.
C. Prior Restraint Licensing Schemes and the Presumption of
Invalidity
Given the gravity of prior restraint and the severity of its
infringement on First Amendment rights, the Court has placed
upon such actions a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity. 13  The Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota"
4
recognized prior restraints as unconstitutional except in exceptional
circumstances," 5 and forty years later reaffirmed that "showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint" is a heavy
111. See Rend L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The
Judicial Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial
Participants, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1171-72 (1990) (explaining that the prior
restraint doctrine is commonly used to protect the rights of communicators
rather than receivers of information).
112. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 29 n.17 (1978) ("[Tlhe First
and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public to receive
such information and ideas as are published.") (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
113. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
114. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
115. Id. at 716.
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burden. 16 OFAC was likewise required to justify the prior restraint
it imposed via its trade sanctions.
When licensing schemes implicate prior restraint, the
analysis of their constitutionality will vary greatly according to
whether the prior restraint is content-based or content-neutral.
Content-based prior restraints are regulations that restrict
communications based on their content, and must meet strict
scrutiny. 1 7 A content-neutral prior restraint applies regardless of
the message conveyed and is subject to a lower level of scrutiny.""
These regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and must "leave open ample alternative
channels for communication." ' 9
The Supreme Court has demonstrated that content-neutral
licensing schemes are more acceptable than content-based
schemes. 2" The Court nevertheless continues to scrutinize content-
neutral regulations,"' reaffirming that any inhibition of
communication, whether or not it targets one type of speech,
infringes First Amendment rights and must be justified. The trade
116. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (quoting Org.
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
117. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally
and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message
it conveys."); see also Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098
(2009) ("Restrictions on speech based on its content are 'presumptively
invalid' and subject to strict scrutiny.")
118. See Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes: Under Current
Jurisprudence, What Permits are Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 406
(2008).
119. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
120. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
(noting that content-based restrictions are held to a higher level of scrutiny).
121. Content-neutral regulations are classified as such if they apply to all
speech regardless of the message. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 105, at 936
(citing examples of time, place, and manner regulations on speech such as the
prohibition of posting signs on all public utility poles). The OFAC trade
sanctions restrict speech based on its delivery through an Internet service, and
are therefore manner-based.
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sanctions at issue were content-neutral regulations, broadly
prohibiting the export of goods and services and hindering all
communication taking place in those media, regardless of the
message. The following section will analyze OFAC's past trade
sanctions in light of these requirements and will determine whether
the prior restraint posed was justified.'22
1. The trade sanctions were based on a significant governmental
interest
OFAC trade sanctions against countries such as Iran are
imposed in a three-fold effort to protect the United States'
economic well-being, foreign policy goals, and national security. '
To these ends, OFAC economic sanctions attempt to prevent
hostile countries from benefiting financially from transactions with
the United States; sanctions therefore tend to be created and
amended in response to foreign affairs. For example, the 1987
import embargo on goods originating in Iran was issued "[a]s a
result of Iran's support for international terrorism and its aggressive
actions against non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf."' 2 4 In
1995 the sanctions were tightened due to "Iranian sponsorship of
international terrorism and Iran's active pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction." 25 Despite much criticism of the secondary effects of
these sanctions,126 all that the Constitution requires is a showing
that the purpose furthered is significant.
122. For a similar analysis of OFAC's licensing scheme dealing with
publishing activities between the United States and Iran, see Tracy J. Chin,
Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFAC's Regulations Restrain First
Amendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1883 (2008).
123. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Our Mission, supra note 63.
124. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, AN OVERVIEW OF OFAC
REGULATIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 1, http://www.treas.gov/
offices/enforcemen t/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., ROBIN RENWICK, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1-3 (Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981) (arguing the alleged failures
of sanction programs include the negative impact on citizens of hostile
countries rather than the governments the sanctions target and the negative
impact on the American economy).
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National security and foreign policy objectives are
indisputably significant governmental interests, and the
government's interest in regulating economic transactions between
itself and hostile countries is equally compelling. The Second
Circuit in Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs'27 found
that regulations "designed to limit the flow of currency to specified
hostile nations" contributed to "the furtherance of a vital interest of
the government."' 2 Although it is clear that the relevant portions
of the sanctions were based on significant governmental interests,
the inquiry does not end there. The sanctions must have been
narrowly tailored to these interests, and the next section will
demonstrate that they were not.
2. The sanctions were not narrowly tailored
to a governmental interest
A law or regulation is narrowly tailored if it is neither
overbroad nor under-inclusive in relation to the purpose it purports
to serve. 129 The economic goal of the sanctions and the restriction
of financial benefit to hostile countries is difficult to reconcile under
the "narrowly tailored" test. The Web 2.0 sites in question-the
services that allow users to upload photographs and videos, post
discussions, create blogs-do not typically generate fiscal
transactions. The broad sanctions, however, required all Web 2.0
sites to be blocked from sanctioned countries, regardless of whether
they created economic benefit for the users or their countries. This
is precisely what constitutes a law that is not narrowly tailored; the
sanctions were so broad that they encompassed a mass of services
that were not related to economic transactions.
The national security objective of the sanctions fared no
better. Despite varying verbiage in the Supreme Court's decisions,
the overall tenor is the same: "The word 'security' ... should not be
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
127. 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968).
128. Id. at 445.
129. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (striking down an
over-inclusive statute that hindered free speech).
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Amendment.""13"1 The Court has historically been very hostile to
arguments that speech harms national security, and in New York
Times Co. v. United States,"' Justice Stewart declared in no
uncertain terms that there must be a threat of "direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" in order for
prior restraint to stand."' In Schenck v. United States,3 ' Justice
Holmes declared that free speech may only be restricted when the
speech is "of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils" the
government seeks to prevent. 1
34
Web 2.0 sites essentially create a channel of communication
and indicate no connection to a "direct, immediate and irreparable
damage" to the United States, or any "clear and present danger."
The sites simply allow for communication despite a repressive
government, and allow for information to flow more freely between
Iran and the United States. Of course, any line of communication
may be used in an "evil" manner, but such a connection is tenuous
and broad, and lacks urgency, rendering the sanctions overbroad
and not narrowly tailored to their objective of protecting national
security.
As to the third objective of protecting foreign policy
concerns, blocking Web 2.0 services in Iran arguably created a
result which was the opposite of its intended effect. The United
States is at odds with the current Iranian regime, yet the blockage
of these Web 2.0 tools during an uprising against that regime
seemed to hinder, rather than further, the opposition movement.
By mandating the blockage of these tools, the United States was
effectively helping the Iranian government to censor its citizenry
and restrict the flow of information, making the regime more
powerful. Because the sanctions were structured in a way which
would hinder tools that actually further our foreign policy
objectives, they were not narrowly tailored. The sanctions, in
130. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (Pentagon Papers).
131. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
132. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
133. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
134. Id. at 52.
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prohibiting vital communication tools, were not narrowly tailored
to the government's economic, national security, and foreign policy
objectives, and thus infringed on First Amendment freedoms more
than the Constitution allows. The next section will examine
whether the sanctions allowed alternative means for
communication to take place.
3. The Sanctions do not leave open ample alternative channels for
communication
In justifying content-neutral regulations, the government
must show that it is "leav[ing] open ample alternative channels for
communication." '35 In Hill v. Colorado, 3 the Court upheld a law
that prohibited protesters from coming within eight feet of
individuals outside a hospital for the purpose of protest, education,
or the distribution of literature. The Court reasoned that, in
addition to the law being narrowly tailored to a significant
governmental interest, there remained other opportunities for
speech; specifically, protesters were still able to demonstrate from a
distance of eight or more feet. 137 In order to refute that ample
channels for communication exist, a plaintiff must show that the
remaining avenues are inadequate.
1 3
As illustrated by its response to the election protests, the
current Iranian regime does not hesitate to block communications
and the flow of information when it deems necessary. It is bold in
its blocking of non-state-sponsored media, and just as blatant in its
attack on Internet services. Without websites like Twitter and
YouTube, the outside world would have known distressingly little
about the post-election turmoil in Iran. News networks were fed
state-sponsored information, and communication did take place by
phone and mail, but the mass influx of timely news and images
came to the Western world via Web 2.0. The sanctions, if enforced,
135. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
136. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
137. Id. at 711 ("[T]he 'free zone' created by the statute ... left open
ample alternative means of communication because signs and leaflets may be
seen, and speech may be heard, at a distance of eight feet.").
138. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
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would have left us with a wholly inadequate receipt of
communications and information-the remaining avenues were in
no sense of the word "ample." If the State Department thought
they were sufficient, it would likely not have encouraged Twitter's
role in facilitating communications, "9 nor would it have created a
new general license for these services.
Because the past sanctions failed the third and final test in
scrutiny of prior restraints, OFAC's violation of our right to receive
information was without justification and was therefore
unconstitutional.
D. Procedural Requirements
In addition to the above-discussed requirements, prior
restraint licensing schemes are also subject to scrutiny based on the
procedural safeguards they contain. 41  Although content-neutral
licensing schemes are not subject to the rigidity imposed on
content-based schemes, 14' remnants of those requirements are still
applicable. The Court in Thomas v. Chicago Park District
142
recognized that "even content-neutral . . . restrictions can be
applied in such a manner as to stifle free expression," and hence
required that (1) such schemes "contain adequate standards to
guide the official's decision" and (2) that these decisions be subject
to "effective judicial review." '  The OFAC sanctions failed on
both counts.
1. OFAC Discretion
In order to prevent content-based discrimination from
occurring during the licensing process, courts strike down laws that
139. See Pleming, supra note 4, and accompanying text.
140. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (holding that a
prior restraint "avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system").
141. See id.
142. 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
143. Id. at 323.
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provide licensing officials with limitless discretion. For example, in
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,'4 the Court
found that a law requiring a permit for placing a newspaper vending
machine on public property allowed too much discretion in the
permit issuer. 45 The Court declared that without clear standards, a
licensing scheme allowing such discretion "constitutes a prior
restraint and may result in censorship."' 146 This "clear standards"
requirement reappeared in Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, '47 in which the Court struck down a permitting scheme
for demonstrations on the grounds that there were "no articulated
standards" to guide the officials. 14
The trade sanctions prior to the revisions left much to be
desired in the way of clear standards. As described above, OFAC
reserves the right to issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis
for otherwise prohibited activities. 49  In this licensing scheme,
OFAC simply states that its licensing determinations are "guided
by U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns."' 5" Formal
agency appeals are not available to those whose requests are
denied, and OFAC revisits license applications at its own
discretion. 5' Furthermore, it is difficult for license applicants to
evaluate the likelihood of obtaining a license -although OFAC
issues interpretive guidance on past decisions, it explicitly states
that this guidance should not be relied upon and that OFAC
• • 152
reserves the right to change its interpretations.
144. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
145. Id. at 757.
146. Id.
147. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
148. Id. at 133.
149. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b) (2009).
150. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#64
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
151. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions
and Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/
answer.shtml#62 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
152. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions
and Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/faq/
answer.shtml#13 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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It thus appears that the OFAC licensing officials maintained
unfettered discretion. OFAC gave no indication of the standards it
applied to its licensing decisions. Instead, it gave a vague recitation
of the sanctions' purposes and provided interpretive guidance
hedged by a disclaimer. In placing too much discretion on licensing
officials, the sanctions failed the first prong of the test.
2. Effective Judicial Review
Procedural safeguards are necessary "to obviate the dangers
of a censorship system."' 53  Without them, license applicants
seeking consideration or judicial review would be powerless against
the licensing entity, and the speech sought to be performed by the
license applicant would be caught in a system with possibly no
recourse. Judicial review of OFAC's licensing decisions is for all
intents and purposes non-existent. Not only does OFAC claim full
discretion for the length of time it takes to respond to a license
request,154 but there is no formal appeals process within the
agency.155 The only means for redress is requesting that OFAC
revisit a license application, a determination over which OFAC
again retains discretion.15 Furthermore, the District Court for the
District of Columbia held in 2007 that OFAC's specific licensing
decisions are not subject to judicial review, rendering the
153. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
154. "The length of time for determinations to be reached will vary
depending on the complexity of the transactions under consideration, the
scope and detail of interagency coordination, and the volume of similar
applications awaiting consideration." Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#63 (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
155. A denial by OFAC of a license application constitutes final agency
action. The regulations do not provide for a formal process of appeal.
However, OFAC will reconsider its determinations for good cause, for
example, "where the applicant can demonstrate changed circumstances or
submit additional relevant information not previously made available to
OFAC." Office of Foreign Assets Control FAQ & A, supra note 152.
156. Id.
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protections of the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable. 5 7
With limitless discretion and an absence of effective judicial review,
OFAC's licensing scheme did not contain adequate procedural
safeguards.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in Part I of this Note, there are often
limited channels of communication between the United States and
sanctioned countries, and these channels can be crucial. The U.S.
trade sanctions prior to the March 2010 revision prevented those in
sanctioned countries from accessing many Web 2.0 services, and if
the penalties for trade violations had their desired effect, more
blockages would inevitably have followed. The First Amendment
guarantees a right to unhindered communication, whether
Americans are the ones providing the communication or receiving
it. It recognizes the importance of open debate and unrestricted
dialogue, and, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Nebraska
Press Ass'n. v. Stuart,5 ' "[t]he damage [from preventing that
communication] can be particularly great when the prior restraint
falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current
events."
, 159
Communication does not lose its value simply because it
crosses borders. In 1988, the trade sanctions were revised to
include an exemption for informational materials when the
government recognized the inherent wrong in prohibiting
information from passing between the U.S. and sanctioned
countries. OFAC realized the importance of open
communication and allowed informational materials (though it
would later exclude Web 2.0 services) to be imported and exported
157. Cubaexport v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 516 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59
(D.D.C. 2007) (stating that because OFAC has complete discretion over
specific licensing decisions, there is "no justiciable standard for evaluating"
them).
158. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
159. Id. at 559.
160. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, § 2502, 102 Stat. 1107, 1371.
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without regulatory interference. 61 In introducing the proposed
information exceptions to Congress, Senator Mathias quoted
Ronald Reagan: "Expanding contacts across borders and
permitting a free exchange or interchange of information and ideas
increase[s] confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the
world reduce[s] it.'1 62 The distinction that OFAC made between
informational materials and services was superficial and served only
to weaken our channels of communication. Web 2.0 services serve
precisely the same function as informational materials, and OFAC's
failure to recognize this fact was simply an indication of its failure
to adapt in a timely manner to a changing world and new
technologies.
In December 2009, the U.S. State Department formally
recognized that "[I]nternet-based communications are a vital tool
for change in Iran," and admitted that U.S. sanctions "are having an
unintended chilling effect on the ability of companies such as
Microsoft and Google to continue providing essential
communications tools to ordinary Iranians."1 3  The State
Department recommended that OFAC issue a general license that
would authorize downloads of free mass market software
"necessary for the exchange of personal communications and/or
sharing of information over the internet such as instant messaging,
chat and email, and social networking."'' 4 Such a waiver of the
sanctions must be "essential to the national interest of the United
States," and the State Department thus based this license on the
necessity to "foster and support the free flow of information to
individual Iranian citizens."' 165 In March of 2010, OFAC followed
the State Department's recommendation, and even extended this
161. Id.
162. 132 CONG. REC. S6381,6550 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Mathias). "Today's telecommunications media can bring into our living
rooms the images and voices of exponents of every political and artistic
tendency around the globe. To deny . . .information entry or exit not only
injures our freedom but insults the intelligence of the American people." Id.
at 6551.
163. Verma Letter, supra note 5.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id.
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general license to Cuba and Sudan.' 66 Although the government
has failed to recognize the constitutional implications of the
sanctions, its recent actions are certainly indicative of its
appreciation of the value of Web 2.0 tools, particularly in light of
the recent events in Iran.
While this development is promising, a more permanent
solution is needed. The general license is a device too fragile to
constitute a reliable safeguard against future governmental actions;
an administration change, international events, or a shift in foreign
relations could result in a revocation of this waiver. For example, in
2008, OFAC revoked U-Turn licenses167 for transactions between
the United States and Iran, restricting funds transfers involving the
two countries, in a purported effort "to expose Iranian banks'
involvement in the Iranian regime's support to terrorist groups and
nuclear and missile proliferation."'1' 6 The current political climate
in Iran is tumultuous at best, and future relations between Iran and
the United States could lead to major shifts in sanction policy. The
U.S. government regards sanctions as a foreign policy tool, and
could easily revoke this general license.
As a safeguard to the interests it currently purports to
protect, and as a safeguard to the First Amendment right to receive
communications, this waiver of the sanctions must take a more solid
form. The Berman Amendments of 1988 limited OFAC's ability to
regulate informational materials as a part of its sanctioning
program, 69 and Congress should do the same for Web 2.0 services.
A Congressional statute would undoubtedly be more difficult to
reverse than a general license issued by OFAC. Even more
166. See 75 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pts. 515, 538, and 560).
167. U-Turn licenses gave American financial institutions the right to
conduct funds transfers that were initiated outside Iran and ended outside
Iran, but which passed through the Iranian system, providing Iranian banks,
persons, or the Iranian Government with an economic benefit, even if
indirectly. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Revokes Iran's
U-Turn License (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/hp1257.htm.
168. Id.
169. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) (2006).
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permanent, and therefore more preferable, would be a Court ruling
holding that the application of the trade sanctions to Web 2.0
services is unconstitutional. This is an avenue which should be
explored in order to safeguard against administration changes and
evolving foreign policy.
